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The Effect of Exchange Rate Changes on 
 China’s Labor-Intensive Manufacturing Exports 
 
 
   
Abstract 
 
Chinese policymakers have resisted calls for faster renminbi appreciation partly 
because they fear it will reduce low technology exports.  We investigate this issue using a 
panel data set including China’s exports of labor-intensive goods to 30 countries.   We 
find that an appreciation of the RMB would substantially reduce China’s exports of 
clothing, furniture, and footwear.  We also find that an increase in foreign income, an 
increase in the Chinese capital stock, and an appreciation among China’s competitors 
would raise China’s exports.  Since Europe is the second leading exporter of labor-
intensive manufactures behind China, these results indicate that the large appreciation of 
the euro relative to the RMB since 2001 has crowded out European exports.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China’s exports have grown faster than 22 percent per year between 2005 and the 
first half of 2008. Its current account surplus exceeded 9 percent of Chinese GDP in 2006 
and 11 percent of GDP in 2007.  Its economy grew by more than 10 percent per year 
between 2004 and 2007 and its capital account surplus in 2007 approached 3 percent of 
GDP.  Many believe that China faces a fundamental disequilibrium in its balance of 
payments and that it should let the renminbi appreciate.
1
The Chinese government has resisted calls for faster appreciation, saying it would 
damage labor-intensive exports (Ito, 2008).  Chinese policymakers have argued that 
profit margins for labor-intensive goods are razor-thin and thus that an RMB appreciation 
would decimate these industries.  Ito also discussed how fear of losing competitiveness 
relative to other exporting nations has prevented China from allowing its currency to 
appreciate. 
Previous work has investigated how exchange rate changes affect China’s 
processed and ordinary exports. Processed exports, as classified by the Chinese customs 
authorities, are goods that are produced using intermediate goods that have been imported 
duty free.   Neither the imported inputs nor the assembled final goods normally enter 
China’s domestic market.
2 Ordinary exports, in contrast, are produced primarily using 
domestic inputs.  Marquez and Schindler (2007), Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007), and 
Thorbecke and Smith (2007) all found that an RMB appreciation causes a larger decline 
in ordinary exports than in processed exports.  This finding makes sense in light of the 
                                                 
1 To the extent that China’s capital account surplus reflects speculative inflows, the degree of 
disequilibrium would be less. 
2 Gaulier et al.  (2005) provided a good discussion of ordinary and processed trade.   3
fact that more of the value-added of ordinary exports than of processed exports comes 
from China. 
Previous authors have also attempted to control for competition between China 
and other countries in third markets.  Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (2003) found 
using a gravity model that a 10 percent depreciation of one East Asian exchange rate 
relative to other East Asian exchange rates would increase exports from the depreciating 
country by 8 percent   Thorbecke (2006) reported results from dynamic ordinary least 
squares (DOLS) estimation indicating that a 10 percent depreciation of ASEAN 
currencies against the dollar would decrease China’s exports to the U.S. by 7.5 percent.  
Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007) also found using DOLS techniques that a depreciation 
of the RMB relative to exchange rates in third countries tends to increase China’s exports 
to the U.S.  Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil and Thorbecke reported statistically 
significant coefficients, but Cheung et al. did not. 
In this paper, we focus not on all of China’s ordinary exports but only on labor-
intensive manufacturing exports.  These goods include clothing, furniture, and footwear.  
We construct a panel data set of China’s exports of labor-intensive manufactures to 30 
countries.  We explain exports using the bilateral RMB exchange rate and income in the 
importing countries.  We control for competition between China and other countries by 
including a weighted exchange rate from the 17 other leading exporters of labor-intensive 
goods.  We control for supply side factors by including China’s capital stock in 
manufacturing. 
The results indicate that an appreciation of the RMB would substantially reduce 
China’s labor-intensive exports.  They also indicate that an increase in foreign income, an   4
appreciation among China’s competitors, and an increase in the Chinese capital stock 
would raise China’s exports.  
These results support the claim of the Chinese government that an RMB 
appreciation would damage labor-intensive exports.  They also indicate that fear of losing 
competitiveness relative to other countries may have prevented the Chinese authorities 
from allowing the RMB to appreciate.   
The next section presents the data and methodology we employ.  Section 3 
contains the results.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 China’s Labor-Intensive Manufacturing Exports 
Figure 1 shows China’s exports in 2006 broken down by product category.  The 
data come from the CEPII-CHELEM database.   The largest category is final electronics 
goods, defined to include consumer electronics goods, computer equipment, 
telecommunications equipment, and electrical apparatuses. In 2006 33 percent of China’s 
exports were in this category.  The second largest category is labor-intensive 
manufactures, defined to include carpets, clothing, fabrics, furniture, knitwear, leather, 
and yarns.  In 2006 21 percent of China’s exports were in this second category. 
Final electronics goods are produced largely within East Asian production and 
distribution networks.  Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and multinational companies 
located in ASEAN produce sophisticated technology-intensive intermediate goods 
and ship them to China for assembly and re-export.  According to Koopman, Wang, 
and Wei (2008), Chinese value-added in these sectors is small relative to the costs of   5
the intermediate goods imported from abroad.  For instance, they reported that 
Chinese value-added in electronic computers was less than 5 percent in 2002 and that 
Chinese value-added in telecommunications equipment was less than 15 percent.       
Labor-intensive manufactures, on the other hand, are produced largely using 
domestic inputs.  Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) reported that Chinese value-
added in these industries is approximately 70 percent. 
Figure 2 shows China’s share of the world’s exports of labor-intensive 
manufacturing goods.  In 2006 China surpassed Europe to become the world’s 
leading exporter of these goods.  Its share reached 29 percent, compared with 27 
percent for Europe.  The third leading region, East Asia ex-China, provided about 12 
percent of total world exports of these products in 2006.
3
Figure 3 shows the countries and regions that purchased China’s labor-
intensive exports.  In 2006 30 percent went to the U.S., 17 percent went to the 
Euroland, 14 percent went to Japan, and the remainder went to the rest of the world.    
China thus produces labor-intensive manufactures largely using domestic 
inputs and sells these products throughout the world.      
  
2.2 The Imperfect Substitutes Model 
We investigate how exchange rate changes affect China’s exports of labor-
intensive manufacturing goods.  To do this we use data on China’s real exports of these 
                                                 
3 There are different ways to consider the countries that compete with China in exporting labor-intensive 
manufactures.  China exports 29 percent of the world’s total and the Euroland exports 27 percent.  From 
this perspective China and Europe are the key competitors.  However, these lower value-added goods make 
up less than 6 percent of Europe’s total exports.  For Bangladesh, these goods make up more than 90 
percent of its total exports, Thus from Bangladesh’s perspective China is a key competitor even though 
Bangladesh exports only 1 percent of the total quantity of labor-intensive manufacturing exports to the 
world each year.   6
goods to 30 countries.   There has been substantial variation both cross-sectionally and 
over time in the RMB exchange rate relative to these countries.  This approach should 
thus help to shed light on how exchange rate changes affect the exports of labor-intensive 
manufactures. 
According to the imperfect substitutes model of Goldstein and Khan (1985), 
exports can be represented as:     
 
                                       = α10  + α11   + α12  +  εt                              (1)  t ex t rer   t rgdp
 
where   represents real exports,  represents the real exchange rate,   represents 
foreign real income, and the variables are measured in natural logs. 
t ex t rer   rgdp
  It is possible to identify the parameters in equation (1) if the elasticity of supply is 
infinite.  In the present case there is reason to believe that the perfect supply elasticity 
assumption is reasonable.  China has almost two hundred million redundant rural laborers 
and tens of millions more who are either joining the labor force each year or 
underemployed in the urban sector.  By migrating to low-skilled assembly activities these 
workers may enable exporters to increase supply at constant prices.   
There is some evidence that demand pressures have recently started pushing up 
costs and export prices in China.  The Congressional Budget Office (2008) for instance 
documented that Chinese tradable prices began increasing in 2007.   Since this increase in 
the “China price” occurred after the sample period used here, it should not affect our 
ability to identify the parameters in equation (1).    
   7
 
2.3 Dependent and Independent Variables  
The dependent variable is the log of labor-intensive manufacturing exports.  
These goods come from six product categories: clothing, furniture, leather, carpets, yarns 
and fabrics, and knitwear.
4  Data for exports of these goods measured in U.S. dollars are 
obtained from the CEPII-CHELEM database and are deflated using BLS price deflators 
for these six categories.  In our regressions we use both labor-intensive manufacturing 
exports aggregated together and labor-intensive manufactures disaggregated by industry. 
Since Orcutt (1950), economists have recognized the benefit of using disaggregated data 
to estimate trade elasticities.  If elasticities differ by industry, aggregated estimates may 
be biased (see Bahmani-Oskooee and Ardalani, 2006). 
The panel data set includes exports from China to 30 countries over the 1987-
2006 period.  These countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
The independent variables include the bilateral real exchange rate (rer ) between 
China and the importing country and real income in the importing country ( ).  
Following Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007), we use the Chinese capital stock in 
rgdp
                                                 
4 As defined by CEPII, these categories correspond to the SITC classification numbers 61, 65, 82, 83, 841, 
842, 843, 844, 845, 846.1, .2, .91, .92, .93, .94, .99, 848.1, .2, .3, .4, 85, and 894.77.  
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manufacturing as a control for China’s supply capacity.
5  We also include a WTO 
dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 after China joined the WTO and a weighted 
exchange rate (wrer ) of the 17 other leading exports of labor-intensive manufactures 
relative to the importing country.
6
To calculate the weighted exchange rate for the countries that compete with China 
we use the shares of exports from the other 17 leading exporters of labor-intensive 
manufactures (LIM) each year.  For every year between 1987 and 2006 we calculate 
weights based on the percentage of LIM coming from the 17 other leading exporters to 
the world.  For instance, if in 2006 Italy provided 10 percent of the LIM exports from the 
17 leading exporters other than China then Italy would have a weight of 0.10. When 
trying to explain exports to Argentina in 2006, the bilateral real exchange rate between 
Italy and Argentina in 2006 would be multiplied by 0.10 (i.e., 0.10*rerItaly, Argentina,2006).  
We then proceed in the same way for the other 16 leading exporters, giving us a weighted 
exchange rate for Argentina in 2006 that can be written: 





2006 , , 2006 , 2006 , *
i
Argentina i i Argentina rer w wrer
In the same way, we calculate weighted exchange rates for the other 29 importers in 2006. 
We then repeat the procedure for each year going back to 1987, recalculating the weights 
and using whatever countries were the 17 leading exporters each year.  
                                                 
5 Data on China’s capital stock come from Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006).  Following Cheung, Chinn, and 
Fujii (2007), we assume that the capital stock grows by 12 percent in 2005 and 2006. 
 
6 Garcia-Herrero and Koivu (2007) posited that China’s WTO accession began affecting China’s trade after 
it became certain that China would join the WTO in the beginning of 2000.  We thus set the WTO dummy 
variable equal to one beginning in 2000.   
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To calculate  in this way it is necessary to measure exchange rates using a 
common numeraire.  We can do this by employing the real exchange rate variables 
constructed by the Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et D’Information Internationales 
(CEPII).   These variables compare observed exchange rates to PPP ones, and exceed 100 
when the currency is overvalued.  They are thus comparable both cross sectionally and 
over time.  These variables are obtained from the CEPII-CHELEM database.   
wrer
Data on  and rgdp are also obtained from CEPII-CHELEM.  An increase in 




2.4  Econometric Methodology 
 
We estimate the model using dynamic ordinary least squares.  DOLS involves 
regressing the left-hand side variable on a constant, the right-hand side variables, and lags 
and leads of the first difference of the right-hand side variables.  The individual export 
equations have the form: 




, 4 , , 3 , , 2 , , 1
6 5 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 ,
N j T t
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α α α α
β β β β β β β
  
Here   represents real exports from China to country j,   represents the 
bilateral real exchange rate between China and country j,   represents the 
weighted exchange rate between the 17 other leading exporters of labor-intensive 
t j ex , t j rer ,
t j er , wr  10
manufactures and country j,  equals real income in importing country j, Time 
is  a time trend, WTO is the WTO dummy variable, and μj is a country j fixed effect.   
t j rgdp ,
  The data set extends from 1987 to 2006.  We use one lead and lag in the DOLS 
estimation.   
 
 
3.  RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents the results from estimating equation (3).  Our preferred 
specification is in the first column.  It includes the capital stock and excludes the time 
trend. The results in the other columns are similar.  The results are also similar if we use 
more lags and leads in the DOLS estimation.
7
The first row reports the coefficient on the RMB exchange rate with the importing 
country.  The elasticity in our preferred specification is -1.84, and ranges from -1.60 to 
-1.83 in the other specifications.  The coefficients are all highly statistically significant.  
The values imply that a 10 percent appreciation of the RMB would reduce labor-intensive 
exports by about 18 percent.   
The second row reports the coefficient on the weighted exchange rate among 
countries competing with China in third markets. The elasticity in our preferred 
specification is 0.91, and ranges from 0.85 to 0.92 in the other specifications.  The 
coefficients are again highly statistically significant in every specification.  The values 
imply that a 10 percent appreciation among countries competing with China in exporting 
labor-intensive goods would increase China’s exports by about 9 percent.   
The third row reports the coefficient on income in the importing country.  The 
                                                 
7 These results are available on request.   11
coefficient in our preferred specification is 1.82, and ranges from 1.73 to 1.83 in the other 
specifications.  These values imply that a 10 percent increase in income in the importing 
country would raise China’s exports by about 18 percent.   
The fourth row reports the coefficient on the Chinese capital stock.  The 
coefficient equals 1.12 in the first specification and 1.15 in the second.  It is highly 
statistically significant in both specifications.   
Finally the fifth row reports the coefficient on the WTO dummy variable.  It is 
negative in both specifications and only marginally significant in one of the specifications. 
Table 2 presents the results for our preferred specification disaggregated by 
industry.  The coefficients on the RMB exchange rate in Table 2 are consistent with the 
results in Table 1.  The elasticities are larger for knitwear and furniture, smaller for yarns 
& fabrics and carpets and about the same for leather and clothing.  They are statistically 
significant in every specification.   
The coefficients on the weighted exchange rate among countries competing with 
China in Table 2 also appear broadly consistent with the results in Table 1.  They are 
larger (and highly significant) for leather, furniture, yarns & fabrics, and carpets and 
smaller (and not significant) for clothing and knitwear. 
 The coefficients on income in the importing country in Table 2 are quantitatively 
different from the results in Table 1.  In every case the coefficients are larger for the 
individual industries than for labor-intensive industries aggregated together.  For leather 
and furniture the elasticities exceed 2.5 and for clothing and knitwear they exceed 4.  
These results imply that a 1 percent drop in income in importing countries would reduce 
China’s exports of leather and furniture by 2.5 percent and China’s exports of clothing   12
and knitwear by more than 4 percent. 
   The important implication of the results reported in this section is that exchange 
rates exert a major impact on China’s exports of labor-intensive manufactures.  These 
results support the claim that margins for these goods are thin, and thus that a decrease in 
profits arising from exchange rate changes can cause a large drop in output.  They 
indicate that the concerns of the Chinese government that an RMB appreciation would 
harm exporters of goods such as clothing and footwear are well founded.  The results also 
support the claim that fear of losing competitiveness relative to other exporting nations 
may have prevented China from allowing its currency to appreciate more. 
A second implication of these results is that changes in income in the importing 
country also have a large effect on the demand for these goods.  China’s low-technology 
exporters are thus exposed, not only to an appreciation of the RMB but also to a 
slowdown in the rest of the world.   
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
China’s massive surpluses on both its current account and its capital and financial 
account suggest that an appreciation of the yuan is appropriate.  The Chinese government 
has resisted calls for faster appreciation, saying it would damage labor-intensive exports.  
Ito (2008) has also discussed how fear of losing competitiveness relative to other 
exporting nations has prevented China from allowing its currency to appreciate. 
  In this paper, we examine how an appreciation of the RMB and of exchange 
rates in countries that compete with China would affect China’s labor-intensive   13
manufacturing exports.  To do this we construct a panel data set of China’s exports of 
labor-intensive manufactures to 30 countries.  Evidence from dynamic ordinary least 
squares estimation indicates that an appreciation of the RMB would cause a substantial 
decline in labor-intensive exports from China.  We also find that depreciations in 
countries that compete with China would cause a substantial drop in China’s exports.  
These results confirm the claims of the Chinese government that an exchange rate 
appreciation would damage labor-intensive exports.  They do not necessarily imply, 
though, that China should not let the RMB appreciate.  Many have applauded the fact that, 
as of September 2008, the RMB has appreciated by 20 percent against the dollar.  At the 
same time, though, the RMB has depreciated by 35 percent against the euro.  The 
findings reported here indicate that this depreciation has caused China’s exports of 
clothing, furniture, and footwear to crowd out Europe’s exports of these goods in world 
markets. 
Munchau (2008) discussed how European officials are upset about this, and may 
link the absence of exchange rate liberalization in China with a crackdown on free trade.  
While economically such a response might not make sense, politically it is 
understandable given the dislocation that exchange rate changes have caused in Europe. 
Rather than triggering protectionism, it may be better for China to abandon its de 
facto dollar peg and adopt a regime characterized by:  1) a multiple currency, basket-
based reference rate, and 2) a wider band around the reference rate.  If China adopted 
greater exchange rate flexibility in this way, its large surpluses relative to Europe would 
tend to produce appreciations of the RMB against the euro and ease some of the pressure 
on European exporters.     14
The results in this paper indicate that such an appreciation would be painful for 
Chinese producers of clothing and shoes and might cause these industries to migrate 
abroad.  A stronger RMB would also, however, provide Chinese companies an incentive 
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Figure 1.  China’s Exports by Product Category, 2006. 
 
Note: Final Electronics goods include consumer electronics goods, computer 
equipment, telecommunications equipment, and electrical apparatuses. Labor-
intensive Manufactures includes carpets, clothing, fabrics, furniture, knitwear, 
leather goods, and yarns. 
 
Source: CEPII-CHELEM Database 
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Figure 2.  China, Europe, and East Asia's Shares of 
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Figure 3.  Share of China’s Exports of Labor-Intensive Manufactures Going to Individual 
Countries and Regions in 2006. 
 
Source: CEPII-CHELEM Database   18
 
 
Table 1.  Panel DOLS Estimates of China’s Exports of Labor-Intensive Manufactures to 
30 Countries over the 1987-2006 Period 
 
-1.84*** -1.65*** -1.83*** -1.60***  Bilateral RER 
      (0.15)        (0.12)        (0.15)        (0.12) 
0.91*** 0.85*** 0.92*** 0.86***  Competitor’s RER 
     (0.24)        (0.24)        (0.24)        (0.24) 
      1.82***  1.75***  1.82***  1.73***  Real GDP 
      (0.31)        (0.32)        (0.31)        (0.30) 
1.12***  1.15***   Capital Stock 
      (0.11)          (0.11)   
          -0.03        -0.08*  WTO Dummy 
           (0.05)        (0.05) 
 0.13***  0.13***  Time 
        (0.01)          (0.01) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.94         0.94           0.94         0.94 
No. of observations  508         508  508         508 
 
 
Notes: DOLS(1,1) estimates.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  The data 
extend from 1987 to 2006.  Since the DOLS estimation uses one lead and lag of the first difference of the 
right-hand side variables the actual sample period is from 1989-2005.   
*** (**) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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Table 2.  Panel DOLS Estimates of China’s Exports of Labor-Intensive Manufactures to 








Clothing Knitwear Furniture Yarns  & 
Fabrics 
Carpets 
Bilateral RER  -1.67*** -1.66*** -2.35*** -2.30*** -1.32*** -1.37*** 
  (0.29) (0.32) (0.46) (0.17) (0.23) (0.22) 
Competitor’s RER  0.94***  0.23  0.58  1.03*** 1.53*** 1.40*** 
  (0.26) (0.40) (0.48) (0.22) (0.22) (0.33) 
Real GDP  2.52*** 4.29*** 4.02*** 2.52*** 1.87*** 1.83*** 
  (0.50) (0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.23) (0.36) 
Capital Stock  0.96*** 0.56*** 0.99*** 2.08*** 0.67*** 0.92*** 
  (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.94 0.90 0.92 0.97 0.89 0.89 
No. of observations  504 502 498 490 507 503 
 
Notes: DOLS(1,1) estimates.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  The data 
extend from 1987 to 2006.  Since the DOLS estimation uses one lead and lag of the first difference of the 
right-hand side variables the actual sample period is from 1989-2005.   
*** (**) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
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